

## Message Text

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O P 171220Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0953

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0190

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC

BEGIN SUMMARY. AT ITS APRIL 16 MEETING, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED IN GENERAL TERMS THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE FOR USE BY FRG REP (BEHRENDS) IN MAKING AHG END- OF-ROUND REPORT TO NAC ON APRIL 18. BEHRENDS WILL DRAW ON MATERIAL IN THE OUTLINE, NOT NECESSARILY USING IT IN FULL. BEHRENDS WILL BE ASSISTED BY THE BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN) AND BY THE NORWEGIAN ACTING REP (COL. BRYNTESEN). IN DISTINCTION TO THE CASE OF QRITTEN REPORTS TO NAC, THE AD HOC GROUP DOES NOT ATTEMPT A WORD FOR WORD APPROVAL OF THESE OUTLINES, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED AS SPEAKING NOTES ON WHICH REPORTING REPRESENTATIVE WILL DRAW. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT

DRAFT SPEAKING NOTES FOR REPORT TO NAC ON APRIL 18, 1975

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I. COVERAGE: MY REPORT COVERS THE THREE-WEEK PERIOD FROM 22 MARCH TO 17 APRIL. I WILL ALSO ATTEMPT TO GIVE YOU A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE 5TH ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ENDED YESTERDAY WITH THE 66TH PLENARY SESSION. THE AHG INTENDS TO FOLLOW THIS UP BY ABOUT 20 MAY WITH A WRITTEN REPORT INTENDED FOR SUBMISSION TO MINISTERS.

II. THE PERIOD 22 MARCH/17 APRIL:

1. PLENARIES/INFORMALS

(A) OVERVIEW: IN PLENARY SESSIONS AND IN INFORMAL MEETINGS DURING THIS THREE-WEEK PERIOD NEITHER SIDE SUBMITTED NEW PROPOSALS OR MODIFICATIONS OF OLD PROPOSALS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, ALSO THE TOPICS DISCUSSED AND THE ARGUMENTATION USED WERE IDENTICAL WITH THE TOPICS AND THE ARGUMENTATION OF THE PREVIOUS PERIOD. I CAN THEREFORE REFER TO THE EXPOSITION GIVEN TO YOU ON 21 MARCH BY MY COLLEAGUE, AMBASSADOR DE VOS. THE FINAL MEETINGS OF THE ROUND WERE USED BY EITHER SIDE, AS IS CUSTOMARY, FOR GIVING AN OVERALL VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION.

(B) IN PARTICULAR; DISCUSSION CENTERED AROUND THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(I) THE NATO SIDE CONTINUED TO PUSH FOR A DATA DISCUSSION. IT ALSO PURSUED ITS DETAILED TREATMENT OF IMPORTANT QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE, POINTING OUT THAT THE WEST IS NOT SEEKING "UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES" BUT RATHER SOLUTIONS ENHANCING STABILITY AND MAINTAINING THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES. IN THIS CONTEXT, WESTERN SPOKESMEN UNDERLINED REPEATEDLY THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR THE PRESENT EASTERN ADVANTAGES AND THOSE THE EAST WOULD GAIN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT. I WOULD LIKE TO QUOTE THE FORMULATION DEVELOPED IN THE AHG FOR MAKING THIS LAST POINT CLEAR "AN AGREEMENT WOULD DECREASE THE TOTAL SIZE OF WESTERN ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND WOULD PRECLUDE ANY INCREASE IN THEIR TOTAL SIZE, WHETHER BY MOBILIZATION OF RESERVES, REINFORCEMENT FROM THE OUTSIDE OR BY ANY OTHER MEANS.

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BUT, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE DUTY FORCES STATIONED ON ITS OWN TERRITORY, WHICH IS ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTION AREA, AND WOULD RETAIN THE CAPACITY EVEN TO INCREASE THEIR TOTAL NUMBER WITHOUT INFRINGING THE AGREEMENT".

AT THE SAME TIME OUR SIDE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO RAISE OR PURSUE THE ISSUE OF

MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES, THIS BEING A PROBLEM  
QUITE UNCONNECTED WITH THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION FOR  
EASTERN GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES.

IN THEIR SUMMING-UP STATEMENTS AT THE END OF THE ROUND,  
THE WESTERN SPOKESMEN REPLIED WITH VIGOUR TO THE EASTERN  
CONTENTION THAT THE WEST HAD HARDENED ITS POSITION AND WAS  
BLOCKING PROGRESS WITH A DELIBERATE ATTITUDE OF IN-  
FLEXIBILITY, WHILE THE EAST ALLEGEDLY MADE NEW PROPOSALS. WE  
POINTED OUT, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE NATO-SIDE HAS MADE  
EIGHT IMPORTANT CLARIFICATIONS, ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS  
OF SUBSTANCE SINCE INTRODUCING ITS OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS  
IN FALL OF 1973, MENTIONING (I)  
THE SUGGESTION OF A DATA DISCUSSION AND OF (II) A  
DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, THE PROPOSALS FOR (III)  
ASSOCIATED MEASURES, (IV) A LINK BETWEEN THE PHASES ("FIXED  
PERIOD OF TIME"), (V)  
A REVIEW CLAUSE, AND FOR IMPORTANT COMMITMENTS: (VI) AN  
"ALL PARTICIPANTS COMMITMENT" AS WELL AS (VII/VIII) NON-  
INCREASE COMMITMENTS CONCERNING THE OVERALL MANPOWER OF THE  
GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES IN THE AREA. SIMULTANEOUSLY,  
PROPOSING ONLY MODIFICATIONS OF ITS ORIGINAL DRAFT TREATY  
WHICH ARE OF A LIMITED PROCEDURAL NATURE AND DO NOT MEET ANY  
OF THE WESTERN SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS.

(II) THE WARSAW PACT SIDE, TOO, CONTINUED THE LINE OF  
ARGUMENTATION DESCRIBED BY AMBASSADOR DE VOS IN THE LAST  
BRIEFING TO THE COUNCIL.

- THEY PRESENTED THEIR RECENT MODIFICATIONS OF THE EASTERN  
DRAFT TREATY AS IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS DESIGNED TO MEET  
WESTERN REQUIREMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY CLAIMED THAT BY  
PROPOSING A STAGGERED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST AND  
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SECOND STAGES OF THEIR DRAFT TREATY, THEY HAD TAKEN ACCOUNT  
OF THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE  
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET FORCES ON THE ONE HAND AND THE  
FORCES OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER HAND.

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O P 171220Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0954

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-THEY CONTINUED TO CLAIM THAT THE WESTERN POSITION VIOLATED  
THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY  
AGREED IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS. THEY MAINTAINED THAT THE  
MAIN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS WAS THE WESTERN ATTEMPT TO CHANGE  
THE OVERALL CORRELATION OF FORCES THROUGH GROSSLY ASYM-  
METRICAL REDUCTIONS AND THE REFUSAL OF THE REMAINING  
WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO AGREE FROM THE OUTSET ON THE AMOUNT  
AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS.

- THEY REFUSED TO ENTER INTO A DATA DISCUSSION AT THIS  
POINT AND CONTINUED TO DEMAND REDUCTIONS IN ALL TYPES OF  
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, EXCEPT THE NAVY.

- AFTER EASTER, THE EAST DID NOT PURSUE IN VIENNA THE  
ACCUSATION THAT THE WEST WAS IN THE PROCESS TO BUILD UP  
BOTH THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND  
THE BUNDESWEHR AND THAT THIS INDICATED THAT THE WEST WAS  
NEGOTIATING IN BAD FAITH.

- NEW ASPECTS DID NOT EMERGE.

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2. BILATERALS: DURING RECENT BILATERALS, AS IS COMMON  
TOWARDS THE END OF A ROUND, EASTERN DELEGATES HAVE MADE  
EFFORTS TO FIND OUT POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE MOVEMENT ON THE

WESTERN SIDE.

ONE EASTERN HEAD OF DELEGATION, FOR INSTANCE, SEVERAL TIMES ASKED WHETHER ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE WILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET, PROVIDED THAT THE EAST ACCEPTED COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE WEST COULD ACCEPT A FIRST PHASE PROVIDING, ON BOTH SIDES, FOR THE REDUCTION OF STATIONED FORCES ONLY.

ANOTHER EASTERN HEARD OF DELEGATION, ON THE OTHER HAND, RECENTLY INQUIRED WHETHER THERE WERE POSSIBILITIES OF LIMITING THE BUNDESWEHR AND YET AVOID DISCRIMINATION OF THE FRG, MENTIONING EVEN POSSIBILITIES FOR MODIFYING THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF NATIONAL CEILINGS. HE ALSO HINTED THAT, IF THE WEST MOVED IN THE AREA OF PHASING AND NUCLEAR, THE EAST MIGHT MOVE ON THE QUESTION OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS VIEWPOINT HAS NEVER BEEN EXPRESSED BY SOVIET DELEGATES, WHO MAINTAINED THEIR STRONG OPPOSITON TO ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS FROM VARIOUS EASTERN DELEGATIONS OF THEIR INTEREST IN PURSUING THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDEFINE GROUND FORCES AS A LEAD IN TO A DISCUSSION OF DATA.

GENERALLY, BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS HAVE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE EASTERN DELEGATES ARE WAITING FOR AN IMPORTANT NATO DECISION, PARTICULARLY ONE CONCERNING THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY PREDICTIONS THAT AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE THE EAST WOULD SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY.

3. NEWS MEDIA/PROPAGANDA: REPORT ON PRESS CONFERENCE OF 17 APRIL IF APPROPRIATE.

THE LANGUAGE AND CONTENT OF EASTERN RADIO AND NEWSPAPER COMMENT DIFFERED SOMEWHAT FROM THE BUSINESSLIKE WORKING  
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RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS BEEN MAINTAINED BETWEEN DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA. DURING THE 5TH ROUND, THERE WAS SOMETIMES ABUSIVE PROPAGANDA BLAMING THE WEST FOR IMMOBILITY AND EVEN ULTERIOR MOTIVES IN CONNECTION WITH MBFR. AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE, THIS CAMPAIGN HAS HAD LITTLE OR NO EFFECT AS YET ON THE ATTITUDE OF WESTERN NEWS MEDIA, WHICH CONTINUED TO SHOW LITTLE INTEREST IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

4. 6TH ROUND: AS YOU MAY RECALL, WE AGREED TO OPEN THE 6TH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH A PLENARY SESSION SCHEDULED

FOR 16 MAY.

III. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE 5TH ROUND:

1. OVERVIEW: THE 5TH ROUND WAS A SPARRING ROUND, RATHER STATIC IN CHARACTER. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND, THE EAST INTRODUCED ITS RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. THIS EFFECTIVELY DEFUSED THE POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING FREEZE ISSUE. APART FROM THIS, THE WEST DID NOT IN THIS ROUND INTRODUCE ANY MODIFICATION OR ELABORATION OF ITS POSITION. THE AHG DEVELOPED NEW LINES OF ARGUMENTATION, PARTICULARLY ON THE EFFECTS OF AN IMPLEMENTATION OF EASTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS ON THE SECURITY OF THE WEST, AND ON THE NEED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ADVANTAGES THE EAST WOULD GAIN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

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O P 171220Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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2. EASTERN POSTURE: THE EAST CONTINUED ITS TACTICS TO INTRODUCE FORMAL PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO CREATE THE APPEARANCE OF EASTERN FLEXIBILITY AND TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC

PSOTURE WITHOUT CHANGING ANY BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN POSITION. THEY FOLLOWED UP THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL OF 31 OCTOBER 1974 AND THE FREEZE PROPOSAL OF 12 DECEMBER 1974 WITH MODIFICATIONS TO THEIR DRAFT TREATY OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973 FORMALLY PRESENTED ON 6 MARCH 1975. ALL THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON THE TABLE TODAY, WERE IDENTICAL IN AS MUCH AS THEY PURSUED THE SAME BASIC EASTERN OBJECTIVES, WHICH ARE AT VARIANCE WITH VITAL WESTERN REQUIREMENTS.

FOR TACTICAL AND PUBLIC POSTURE REAONS THE EAST IN THIS ROUND PUT LESS EMPHASIS ON AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP THAN IN THE 4TH ROUND AND MORE EMPHASIS ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR MODIFIED DRAFT TREATY. HOWEVER, IT BECAME APPARENT TOWARDS THE END OF THIS ROUND THAT A PRIME OBJECTIVE OF THE EAST STILL IS TO BRING ABOUT AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP OF SYMBOLIC CHARACTER

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WHICH WOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON THEIR FORCES. IT IS UNLIKELY ALSO IN THE NEAR FUTURE THAT THE EAST, OF ITS OWN, WILL CHANGE ITS BASIC POSITION AS FAR AS ITS DEMANDS ARE CONCERNED FOR

- SYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS,
- IN ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS,
- ON THE BASIS OF PRECISE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS BY ALL FROM THE OUTSET,
- LEADING TO NATIONAL CEILINGS.

ON THE WHOLE, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE EAST WILL CONTINUE TO CONSIDER THE PASSAGE OF TIME ESSENTIALLY IN ITS FAVOUR, PERHAPS EXPECTING FURTHER MOVES ON THE WESTERN SIDE AFTER THE TERMINATION OF CSCE AND/OR AFTER COMPLETION OF THE STUDIES PROMPTED BY THE NUNN-AMENDMENT. WESTERN NEWSPAPER REPORTS, IF NOT INTELLIGENCE RESULTS, SEEM TO HAVE CONVINCED THE EAST THAT SOME PROPOSAL FOR THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS LIKELY TO SURFACE BEFORE LONG. THEY THEREFORE MAY BE ADOPTING A POSTURE OF WAITING FOR A MAJOR MOVE OF THE WEST.

### 3. PROSPECTS:

HOWEVER, THESE REMARKS DO NOT OF THEMSELVES PROVIDE INDICATIONS OF THE NATURE OF THE EASTERN REACTION TO A MAJOR WESTERN MOVE, WHETHER ON OPTION 3 OR ON SOME OTHER ASPECT. BUT, THE LIMITS OF POSSIBLE EASTERN

MOVES IN OUR DIRECTION IN QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE  
PROBABLY CANNOT BE FINALLY ASSESSED IN THE ABSENCE  
OF A MAJOR WESTERN MOVE.

4. AHG REQUIREMENT:

FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIED POSITION,  
THE AHG WOULD WELCOME COUNCIL GUIDANCE ON THE VARIOUS  
ISSUES ALREADY BEFORE THE COUNCIL AS A RESULT OF  
PREVIOUS AHG REPORTS. HOWEVER, ALLIED MOVES ON THESE

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ISSUES ARE IN THEMSELVES UNLIKELY TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

5. NEXT ORAL REPORT:

LET ME CLOSE WITH THE SUGGESTION TO SCHEDULE THE NEXT  
ORAL PRESENTATION FOR 13 JUNE. END TEXT.RESOR

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## Message Attributes

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